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Recommendations to Enhance the Effectiveness of the FMCSA Program, Ticketing Aggressive Cars and Trucks (TACT)

R.G. Hughes

Background

FMCSA’s proposed TACT program (Ticketing Aggressive Cars and Trucks) is an effort to combine public information and awareness (PIA) with increased enforcement to enhance the safety of cars and trucks operating in a shared use roadway environment. The public information and awareness component of the TACT program is similar in many respects to FMCSA’s “No Zone” and “Be Safe Share the Space” programs. FMCSA’s thinking is TACT program implementation could, at least in concept, be modeled after NHTSA’s effectiveb “Click it or Ticket” and “Booze it and Lose It” programs which have been shown to be effective in impacting occupant safety through increased seat belt usage and the avoidance of driving while under the influence of alcohol. In addition to a strong legislative component to programs such as these, the enforcement component consists of periodic, unannounced, static ‘check points’ that provide opportunities for the direct observation of the behaviors of interest.

The behavioral focus of the TACT program, by contrast, is on instances of observed aggressive behavior on the part of the drivers of large trucks and the behavior of motorists operating in close proximity to large trucks. Such behaviors include following too close, speeding, erratic lane changes, etc. The observation of these aggressive behaviors by enforcement personnel is dependent upon enforcement personnel being positioned either in a unmarked patrol vehicle, while viewing the roadway from his/her position in the cab of the truck tractor, or from an airborne location. When airborne or positioned within the cab of the truck, enforcement also requires an additional officer(s) who can, in turn, apprehend the violator once the aggressive behavior is observed. This type of enforcementapproach, while it may be effective, is extremely manpower and resource intensive as well as extremely spatially constrained in its area of influence. Current enforcement methods and strategies make it difficult to effect 24/7 area wide surveillance.

The TACT enforcement component is typically paired with a targeted media campaign consisting of ads run on local media. Where preliminary data (e.g., from Washington State) suggest the effectiveness of the TACT program approach, it is not clear how much of this effectiveness if due to the media component, the enforcement component, or the impact of judicial follow-through and prosecution. The current proposal would focus on increasing the contribution of the public information and awareness component of the TACT program through the development of more representative and targeted, scenario-specific instances of the risks encountered by motorists while operating in close proximity to large trucks.

Overview

We propose to utilize the technical expertise of the NCSHP Accident Reconstruction Unit, the domain-specific appeal of the NASCAR community, and the operational expertise of the NC ‘Road Team’ to expand upon the existing No Zone/Share the Road public information and awareness (PIA) program. The training will utilize an empirical, data-driven approach (using NCSHP accident reconstruction methods and software) to develop ‘scenarios’ that will bring the learner into direct and effective contact with the risks associated with cars and trucks operating in close proximity at realistic roadway speeds. We will utilize the video production capabilities of NCSHP to produce the training, the appeal of which we will ensure through the participation of troopers, reconstruction personnel, Road Team members, and highly visible NASCAR personnel.

Relevance

A more effective No Zone/Share the Road educational and public awareness approach can be a central part of a public information and awareness (PIA) campaign to support North Carolina’s approach to implementation of the TACT program demonstration funded by FMCSA. To the extent that No Zone/Share the Road presentations represent the most frequently used method for informing the public about the risks of operating in the vicinity of large trucks, a more effective instructional program can increase the likelihood that PIA efforts can contribute to measured improvements in truck safety.

Much of the current effort to educate the drivers of passenger vehicles about the risks of driving in/around large trucks centers on the educational approach called “No Zone.” FMCSA introduced the "No-Zone" or "Share the Road" Program in 1994. The program attempts to educate the drivers of passenger vehicles about truck driver field of view limitations (i.e., blind spots), in particular, those to the rear of the large truck or bus as well as to the sides. While there is not a ‘no zone,’ per se, to the front of the truck or bus, motorists are urged to always leave enough distance between them and the following truck to allow the larger vehicle the extra time and space to stop if required. The No Zone campaign also educates motorists about the danger of wide right turns made by trucks and buses.

The basic message implied by the No Zone program is to ‘stay clear of large trucks and buses.’ To the extent that doing so is not always possible and the fact that most of the time spent by motorists in the no zone carries no negative consequence, it is difficult for ‘experience’ alone to shape the desired behavior on the part of motorists. It is easy to experience when you’re ‘in’ the no zone, but very difficult to experience the conditions where ones presence places oneself at risk.

Present No Zone PIA Approach “Necessary” but not “Sufficient”

No Zone is certainly an important and ‘necessary’ concept for motorists to learn, but it is not sufficient to ensure their safety when sharing the road with large trucks and buses. The more important element of motorist-trucker interaction lies in the vastly different operating characteristics of trucks and passenger vehicles; in particular, the significant differences in braking capabilities.

Stopping Distances for Cars Versus Trucks

Speed	Reaction / Braking Distance Cars	Reaction / Braking Distance Trucks	Stopping Distance Cars	Stopping Distance Trucks
40 mph	44' / 80'	44' / 125'	124'	169'
55 mph	60' /165'	60' / 275'	225'	335'
65 mph	71' / 245'	71' / 454'	316'	525'

Above estimates are for 80,000 lb., loaded tractor-trailers and mid-size passenger cars traveling on a dry, level road. Source: National Safety Council's Defensive Driving Course for Professional Truck Drivers.

The scenarios affected by these operational differences are not limited to instances involving passenger vehicles and trucks traveling in the same direction. We know that motorists are often prone to accept risky gaps when attempting to cross the path of a truck approaching from the right or left. The tendency is to underestimate the closing velocity of the truck and to consequently accept a gap that does not provide time for the motorist to clear the path of the approaching truck. Such a scenario poses a risk not only the motorist initiating the crossing maneuver, but for motorists traveling on either side of the truck. An emergency braking maneuver by the truck may not always result in the truck being able to stop in a straight line; that is, without excursions into the adjacent lane or beyond the edge or center line of the roadway. Such problems are exaggerated by reduced lane widths . . . a situation common to construction/work zones.

Underestimating the closing speed of an approaching heavy truck can also contribute to the risks of motorists attempting to turn on to the main line from a stop controlled intersecting roadway. Failure to estimate the closing velocity of the larger vehicle combined with the motorist’s failure to quickly accelerate to the posted main line speed can increase the likelihood of being struck from the rear by the larger vehicle. While the larger vehicle may often be cited for failure to reduce speed, the fault is actually that of the motorist who is struck from the rear. Similar judgment errors can be made by the CMV driver; e.g., failing to allow sufficient time to complete a left turn across approaching traffic. Both the car driver and the truck driver can reduce these types of judgment errors by increasing the extent to which each focuses on the ‘gap(s) beyond’ the immediately approaching vehicle.

An additional scenario where driving in the no zone can be dangerous is where vehicles are operating under rainy conditions. Under such conditions, the tires of the truck can create a fine mist/spray that can significantly degrade a driver’s view when in the blind spot to the side of the truck. Should the truck (as in the previous scenario) be required to brake aggressively, and should that action result in an excursion into the adjacent lane, the motorist whose vision is temporarily obscured has an increased risk of colliding with the truck ( a sideswipe crash) or being forced off the road or into the lane of an oncoming motorist.

Adding the ‘Dynamics’ of Real World Scenarios to the Underlying Problems of No Zone

In short, there are a number of possible scenarios where no zone problems are accentuated by differences in the stopping distances of trucks and passenger vehicles, motorist errors prompted by perceptual difficulties (i.e., accepting risky gaps when approaching objects are large in size), the effects of learned behavior acquired based upon more frequent (e.g., gap acceptance) experience with other passenger vehicles versus trucks, and complications associated with weather conditions and temporary occlusions to a motorist’s ability to view the road and the actions of other vehicles.

Many of these problems are associated with travel on non-interstate roadways. We know that in North Carolina the likelihood of a CMV-involved crash involving a fatality is highest on NC and US numbered highways, roads where there are likely to be reduced lane widths, more extreme horizontal and vertical curvature, and limited or poor access control. These constrained and less controlled roadway environments accentuate the operating limitations of large trucks and buses.

The spatial and temporal dimensions of these potential scenarios need to be carefully addressed. Such scenarios as those described here are not encountered in conventional no zone training. The question, from the standpoint of trying to improve No Zone training, is how to expose motorists to these scenarios in such a way that it is these conditions and not solely proximity to the larger vehicle and its blind spots that the individual will seek to recognize and avoid.

Applying Existing Expertise to the Problem

It is suggested that a first step toward developing more effective instructional approaches to this problem is to engage the professional expertise of those involved in accident reconstruction. In this instance, it is suggested that we engage the Accident Reconstruction Unit of NCSHP. These individuals are highly trained in reconstructing the spatial and temporal dynamics of a crash. Using their expertise in accident reconstruction and the software tools available to them, the task would be to carefully script these scenarios as a preliminary step to modeling them in a virtual (simulation) environment provided by the reconstruction software.

Simulating Realistic Encounters

The next step would be to capture the virtual scenarios in a realistic setting, using innovative video production methods. The individual being trained needs to realistically experience the image(s), sounds, etc. associated with an 80,000 lb tractor trailer initiating an emergency braking maneuver and to experience the likelihood that such a maneuver results in lane, edge line, and/or center line excursions. It’s not just the total distance that it takes a large truck to stop, but its ability to do so while remaining within the lateral space provided by the lane. No zone is not just about whether the driver of the truck or bus can ‘see’ the smaller vehicle, but whether or not the smaller vehicle is endangered by the lateral excursions of the larger vehicle (in particular, a towed trailer). The learner needs to also experience the situation when such an excursion occurs while he/she is in the truck’s lateral no-zones (such as in a situation where wet pavement conditions and spray occlude the passenger vehicle driver’s vision and awareness of such excursions. Visually correct scenario presentations need to be created that illustrate the braking and lane keeping limitations of large vehicles when traveling in confined spaces (e.g, reduced lane widths associated with construction/work zones).

Use of Man-in-the-Loop Simulation

Modern driving simulators with effective visual systems can provide an ideal environment to create these unique conditions, which in real life could not be created without risk to those involved. We would recommend partnering with an organization having a modern driving simulation facility to capture the footage required for effective scenario generation.

Our tendency is to ‘instruct’ motorists regarding safe following distances in terms of ‘numbers of car lengths,’ a concept for which most drivers have no reliable visual reference. We instruct drivers not to ‘cut off’ trucks when passing them, but does the view in the driver’s rear view mirror below immediately convey whether he/she has or has not achieved that distance? If one suddenly has to stop, would the truck in ones rear view mirror be able to stop before striking ones own vehicle in the rear?

These scenarios can be created accurately in the simulator to give those receiving the instruction an accurate visual ‘picture’ of these otherwise hard-to- visualize spatial conditions. Actual exposure to such scenarios in a modern driving simulator, while ideal, does not represent a practical or cost effective strategy. That does not mean that actual exposure to such scenarios in a driving simulator could not be first used to gauge their effectiveness in modifying driver perceptions in these situations.

Gaining the Attention of the Target Audiences

We also recommend approaching the local NASCAR ‘industry’ for its participation not only in the development of these instructional scenarios, but in lending its credibility and celebrity appeal in the promotion of the material. Enormous audiences are reached by NASCAR events and the peripheral activities associated with the race event(s) per se.

We would also engage the participation and input of NC’s Road Team drivers and their parent companies. These individuals and organizations represent the best of the best and lend credibility to this attempt to build upon the present No Zone training.

Bottom Line:

The present public education and awareness campaign referred to as “No Zone” or “Share the Road,” while conveying important safety concepts to motorists who must operate in close proximity to large trucks, does not provide an effective means for the learner to directly experience the effects of operational differences between cars and trucks. Increased spatial awareness of a truck driver’s ‘blind spots’ does not go far enough in terms of realistically conveying conditions where the vastly different operating capabilities of cars and large trucks can result in significant safety risks. We need to take this training one step farther, by saying, ‘if you’re in the no zone, and scenario ‘x’ occurs,’ these are the risks that you face.’

We want to move now from the focus on improved PIA efforts to efforts that address our ability to observe the behaviors in question in the naturally occurring environment.

Enhancing the Enforcement ‘Basics’ of the TACT Program

The 2006 GAO report on FMCSA’s efforts to implement the TACT program (see GAO-06-916) recognizes the contribution of ‘enforcement’ to previous share the road safely program efforts which focused largely on public information and awareness (PIA) efforts to raise the public’s awareness of the risks associated with traveling in the proximity of large trucks.

Enforcement, viewed for some time as an essential component of the three-E’s of highway safety (Engineering, Education, and Enforcement) is without question a critical element in trying to shape and maintain appropriate driver behavior. To the extent that it can be applied reliably and consistently over time to the population of drivers whose behavior it is intended to share, it can be effective.

All behavior modification efforts are dependent upon the ability to observe the behavior in question and to appropriately consequate the behavior when it is observed. In the case of TACT, the behaviors of interest are those defined (on the part of truck as well as passenger car drivers) as ‘aggressive.’ These are commonly defined as following too close, speeding, erratic lane changing, etc. A specific risky behavior on the part of a passenger car driver is ‘cutting off’ a truck (i.e., leaving too little headway between the car and the truck that it is attempting to pass). Another risk behavior on the part of the passenger car driver is pulling out in front of a truck either when attempting to cross the path of the truck or when attempting to merge into the same travel lane as that in which the truck is approaching.

The problem from a behavior modification point of view is not that we disagree on what are the target behaviors, but on our ability to consistently observe them when they occur. The TACT program generally relies upon uniformed law enforcement officers to make these observations. To some extent, persons other than uniformed law enforcement officers act as ‘observers’ (e.g., in the case of Operation Road Watch). The problem is that there are only so many uniformed officers to dedicate to this duty. When their efforts are focused solely on this (as in formal TACT operations) their efforts are generally paid for as ‘over time.’ Because of the sparcity of personnel, TACT enforcement efforts generally have to be concentrated over relatively short periods of time and focused on specific sections of road.

To the extent that the public perceives there to be a clear enforcement focus on these types of behavior, even if randomly applied over time, the visual presence of enforcement (marked car, flashing lights, motorists being ticketed, etc.) can serve to suppress to some degree the behaviors of concern. This ‘conditioned’ response can only be maintained, however, through frequent pairings of the conditioned stimulus (visual perception of enforcement presence) and the consequence with which it is paired (i.e., actual enforcement intervention). Otherwise, it’s a case of ‘out of sight, out of mind.’

Speeding is a good example of where insufficient or erratic enforcement fails to control the target behavior is ‘speeding,’ a behavior generally perceived by the public to be poorly controlled by traditional enforcement and signing.

A hallmark of the TACT enforcement approach has been to have enforcement personnel ride along in the cab of the truck tractor to provide a better vantage point to observe the aggressive behavior of passenger car (or other truck) operators. When aggressive behavior is observed, that observation is relayed to a patrol vehicle counterpart who then intercepts the aggressive driver. From a consistency of enforcement standpoint the problem is that while the counterpart is intercepting the violator, there is a break in enforcement availability. It goes without saying too that the approach can ultimately only be as effective as the adjudication which follows.

So, from TACT enforcement standpoint, clearly what is ideally required is a capability for a continuous, area wide surveillance to observe the target behaviors in question . . . and ideally, a continuous means to cite the violator for the observed behavior. We’ll never reach this goal through uniformed enforcement presence. To the extent that surveillance methods can be developed that are able to detect the target behaviors whenever and wherever they occur, we will be one step closer at least in terms of our ability to ‘observe’ these behaviors.

One option for this type of ‘observation’ capability might be to utilize existing, strategically placed in-road detectors (inductive loops or other technology) capable of detecting vehicle presence, class, and speed, combined with a real time capability to calculate vehicle following distance. A shortcoming of currently available methods for doing this is that the behavior in question is only observed at the point where the vehicles pass over the detector - i.e., not continuously.

To the extent that such detector capabilities are currently available and strategically placed on major roads across the state, they offer a source of data from which to infer the impact of more direct enforcement and PIA efforts on the behaviors in question.

If these capabilities can be equipped with the ability to recognize/identify the vehicle involved (at a minimum to recognize the carrier via a license plate reader or video recording of the carrier’s USDOT number), a citation could in principle be issued electronically. Until there is an equivalent means to electronically or visually identify the owner of the passenger vehicle involved, citing the driver of the passenger vehicle is not possible. A capability for detection and recognition like that referred to here is presently under development by those pursing the concept of ‘virtual weigh stations.’ In this case, one would seek to capture information not only about the truck, but the immediately preceding vehicle passing the detector in advance of the truck (i.e., those conditions where a smaller vehicle is detected to be immediately followed by a larger commercial vehicle.

Whether or not electronic enforcement of vehicle headway/following distance is a goal, the ability to detect this event in real time could, when paired with the use of a variable message sign, be used to ‘inform’ the driver of the truck or the passenger vehicle that it was following too close given the observed speeds of the two vehicles. A message (visual display) to that effect could be presented to the drivers (in much the same way that a vehicle’s speed can be detected by a radar unit and the unit used to display that information to the driver). If the PIA campaign can effectively establish the public’s perception of the risk involved with this behavior, then the feedback provided might be effective (even in the absence of enforcement) in modifying the behavior of the driver(s).

The automatic detection of in-lane instances of trucks following cars (or other trucks) too closely thus has a current technology ‘solution.’ The instance above talked about doing this with some sort (in pavement or otherwise) ‘detector.’ It could also be accomplished with currently traffic camera (e.g., Autoscope) technology solutions. To the extent that a single camera can be programmed to monitor vehicle headways and following distances across multiple lanes, the application would have utility to a number of roadway settings.

The automatic monitoring and detection of vehicle headways and following distances has been demonstrated in the UK. There have been reports that such capabilities have been combined with camera based enforcement as well as with the provision of visual feedback (with or without enforcement) to the drivers involved.

Final Remarks

FMCSA’s TACT program, as currently conceived is, in principle, an extremely expensive, manpower and resource-intensive attempt to observe (and cite) risky behaviors on the part of commercial vehicle drivers and passenger car drivers operating in close proximity to one another. The shear manpower-intensiveness of the present TACT model precludes it from ever having the continuous presence and impact required to significantly affect the problems being addressed. While there is little argument that even this type of active enforcement is essential for the PIA component to be effective, there remains a clear need to develop new enforcement strategies and techniques if effective control is to be achieved over the car/truck operating environment and the risks associated with that operating environment.

We have addressed two areas where we think the current TACT program can be improved. The first involves the use of visual simulation to more effectively capture and present the full range of risks experienced in this operating environment. Understanding of the no-zone concept alone, we believe, is not sufficient. PIA interventions that pose ‘solutions’ in terms of drivers translating an understanding of necessary ‘standoff’ and vehicle separation in terms of ‘numbers of car lengths’ are not likely to change observed behavior.

Real time capabilities that observe ‘violations’ of safe headways and following distances and that provide confirmation of these conditions in real time to the drivers involved will, we believe, be more effective . . . and more effective still when electronic enforcement can be carried out based on that information without any requirement for uniformed enforcement to be present